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One of the problems facing the criminal justice system is unwarranted disparity as a result of unbridled discretion.
Although disparity, by itself, does not necessarily indicate a problem in the criminal justice system, disparity
unwarranted does present a problem. Disparity becomes unwarranted when, controlling for legal factors, extralegal
factors such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age influence court processing decisions. The greater the discretion one
possesses, the higher the likelihood of unwarranted disparity in one’s decisions (Albonetti, 1991; Meeker, Jesilow,
& Aranda, 1992; Bushway & Piehl, 2001). Within the criminal court system, judicial discretion in sentencing has
received the most scrutiny.
More than thirty years ago, there was a call to reform the indeterminate sentencing schemes used in the 1970s
(Spohn, 2002). One of the suggestions was to implement a sentencing guideline system where judges’ sentencing
decisions would be streamlined by funneling sentences through a matrix system, cross-sectioning offense severity
and prior record level. There were many goals to the sentencing guidelines. One of those goals was to reduce
unwarranted sentencing disparity brought on by unfettered discretion judges had in indeterminate sentencing (Hofer,
Loeffler, Blackwell, & Valentino, 2004). Certainty of punishment, therefore, was more important than the autonomy
of judges, given this new reform. The sentence guideline system attempted to increase the transparency and
rationality of punishment (Hofer et al, 2004).
One of the purposes of sentencing guidelines was to reduce discretion – and, thereby, unwarranted disparity (see
Spohn, 2000; Tonry, 1996). One area of discretion that judges retained was in the area of departure sentencing. In
other words, judges could, given particular circumstances, depart from the sentence guideline range. An upward
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departure – or, aggravated sentence – can occur if the judge deemed it to be appropriate to raise the sentence above
the guideline range maximum. A downward departure – or, mitigated sentence – can occur if the judge deemed it to
be appropriate to lower the sentence below the guideline range maximum. Until recently, the decision of an upward
departure was left in the hands of the judge.
Recently, the practice of raising the sentence above the guideline range maximum was put into question by the
United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington (2004). The United States Supreme Court ruled that, while
upward departures are still allowed, a jury must now decide the facts upon which an upward departure is made
rather than relying on the sole discretional authority of the judge. Prior to Blakely, the judge, under the guise of
judicial discretion, would consider certain factors during the sentencing phase. These facts may or may not have
been substantiated by the rigors of the guilt phase of the trial. The Court ruled that this practice violated the
defendant’s right to a jury trial and required that these facts be proven by the same standard as any other facts during
the guilt phase – that is, beyond a reasonable doubt. This ruling, therefore, limited the little discretional authority
the judge might have had (see McVoy, 2005; Wool & Stemen, 2004). “If state and federal sentencing guidelines
represented a revolution in sentencing theory and practice, then Blakely, it is feared, will spark a counter-revolution”
(Frase, 2007, 404).
Given that judicial discretion and disparate decisions are linked in sentencing reforms (see Spohn, 2000) and given
that the Blakely decision further limited judicial discretion (McVoy, 2005; Wool & Stemen, 2004), research is
needed to address discretion and the potential for a decrease in disparities in aggravated sentencing decisions after
the Blakely decision compared to before Blakely. Although there has been a fair amount of empirical research on
unwarranted disparities in aggravated sentencing decisions and a fair amount of legal commentaries on the Blakely
decision, to date, there has been no empirical, systematic study of the connection of the two – that is, the connection
of the Blakely ruling and disparities in aggravated sentencing. This study serves as an explorative first step in
examining upward departures and the potential disparate pitfalls that might exist before Blakely but not after
Blakely.
Research on Aggravated Sentencing
Although there has been no empirical research on the effect of Blakely on departure decisions, there has been
research on departure decisions prior to this ruling. Since the Supreme Court ruled on aggravated sentences, the
review of literature only addresses upward departures. A few interesting findings on downward departure decisions
are footnoted. Legal factors have a major role in whether a judge aggravates the sentence above the sentence
guideline range maximum. Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis (2003) studied aggravated sentences in the state
of Washington where they found that legal variables – offense severity and prior record level – increased the odds of
an upward departure.2 In other words, defendants with a more serious offense and/or prior record are more likely to
receive an aggravated sentence.
Johnson (2003) examined departure sentencing in Pennsylvania and found that legal variables have a statistically
significant effect on upward departures albeit in a direction that was unexpected. They found that an increase in
offense severity or an increase in the defendant’s prior record led to a decrease in the odds of an upward departure
(Johnson, 2003). Examining sentencing under the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines, Kramer and Ulmer (2002)
suggested that courtroom actors may not agree with the harshness of the penalty or view these defendants as less
blameworthy and, therefore, adjust their decision (charging, plea bargaining or sentencing) to coincide with their
beliefs.
Some research has identified mode of conviction as an important factor influencing aggravated sentencing. Engen
and his colleagues (2003) found that those who were convicted at trial had a greater chance of receiving an upward
departure than those who pled guilty. In studying these same effects in Pennsylvania, Kramer and Ulmer (1996)
found that defendants convicted at trial receive, on average, a larger magnitude of aggravated sentence than either
those convicted in a bench trial or those who pled guilty.
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However, they found that the odds of a mitigated sentence decreased given a more serious offense and/or more
serious prior record.
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Research has also suggested that other extralegal factors influence the decision to aggravate sentences. Engen and
his colleagues (2003) concluded that race and/or ethnicity had significant yet mixed effects on upward departures.
The odds that Hispanic defendants received an upward departure was 68% higher than the odds for white
defendants, whereas the odds that black defendants received an upward departure was 35% lower than the odds for
white defendants (Engen et al., 2003). Unlike Engen et al. (2003), however, Johnson (2003) found that race
positively affected upward departures. Johnson (2003) found that black defendants were more likely to receive an
upward departure whereas Engen et al.(2003) found that black defendants were less likely to receive an upward
departure. Johnson (2003) suggested that judges perceive racial minorities as more of a threat and less likely to be
rehabilitated than white defendants.
Prior research also studied whether gender is related to the sentencing departure decision. Engen and his colleagues
(2003) found that gender had no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of upward departure sentencing.3
On the other hand, Johnson (2003) found that male defendants were statistically more likely to receive upward
departures than female defendants, linking to the judicial perception of blameworthiness and dangerousness.
Research has also outlined the relationship of age and departure sentencing. Engen and his colleagues (2003) found
a statistically significant relationship between age and upward departures, finding that older defendants were more
likely to receive upward departures than younger defendants. Johnson (2003) found a dissimilar finding for upward
departures in that older defendants were less likely to receive an upward departure than younger defendants. He
suggested that younger defendants likely carry a stigma that leads judges to be more punitive (Johnson, 2003).
The research indicates that there is a relationship between legal variables – namely, offense severity and prior record
level – and the decision to depart from the sentencing guideline range. There is some – albeit mixed – evidence that
extralegal factors have an effect on the aggravated sentence decision. The question, though, is whether the recent
Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington (2004) impacted upward departure decisions. Given the greater
restraint on judicial discretion and the formalized rules on sentencing in Blakely v. Washington (2004), the impact of
these extralegal factors on upward departures should be minimized after Blakely compared to before Blakely
The Sentencing Guidelines and the United States Supreme Court
Three landmark United States Supreme Court cases set the stage for a study of upward departure sentencing. In
1989, the United States Supreme Court, in Mistretta v. United States (1989), ruled that sentencing guidelines were
constitutional and did not violate the separation of powers clause in the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court did not address the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines or decisions within sentencing guidelines states4
until their landmark ruling in Blakely v. Washington (2004).
Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
Before outlining the ruling in Blakely, it is imperative to summarize the Supreme Court ruling in Apprendi v. New
Jersey which set the precedent for Blakely. Charles Apprendi fired shots into the home of a black family. He was
charged with and pled guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose. This offense carried
with it a five to ten year prison sentence. Originally, the state did not charge Apprendi with a hate crime, which
would allow for an enhanced sentence. After Apprendi pled guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the
sentence because of the racial motivation of the case. The judge found, by preponderance of the evidence, that the
crime was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison, two years over the statutory
maximum of the original charges.
Apprendi appealed, suggesting that any fact presented to the court which increases the statutory maximum for which
a defendant was already charged and convicted violated his right to a jury trial granted to him under the Sixth
Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed and ruled that the United States Constitution required that any fact that may
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They did find, though, that gender has a statistically significant effect on downward departure sentencing, finding
that the odds of receiving a downward departure is 46% greater for female defendants than for male defendants.
4
The Supreme Court also addressed the federal sentencing guidelines in United States v. Booker and United States
v. Fanfan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). However, the scope of this study is limited to state sentencing guideline systems.
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increase the penalty of a crime beyond the maximum sentence already set forth by statute must be both submitted to
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exception to this rule is evidence of prior convictions. The
ruling in Apprendi set the stage for the decision in Blakely.
Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
Unlike Apprendi, which focused on sentencing above the statutory maximum, Blakely focused on sentencing above
the guideline maximum. Ralph Blakely, Jr. was married to his wife Yolanda for 25 years. Complications arose,
which led to Yolanda filing for divorce. In 1998, Blakely kidnapped Yolanda from their home in the state of
Washington, bound her with duct tape, and forced her into a wooden box in his truck. Blakely took Yolanda to a
friend’s house in Montana, where he was arrested.
Blakely eventually pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving both domestic violence and the use of a
firearm. These charges carried a maximum sentence of 53 months according to the sentencing guidelines in the state
of Washington. The judge, however, after hearing Yolanda’s testimony and the cruelty that was involved, imposed
an aggravated sentence of 90 months. Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentence deprived him of his constitutional
right to have a jury decide all legally relevant factors that may affect his sentence. The Court agreed, applying the
precedent set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). The facts were neither admitted by the defendant nor
submitted to the jury, leading the Court to rule that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. The judge could
not impose a sentence above the prescribed sentence guideline range maximum in violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights.
Blakely v. Washington (2004), thus, followed in the footsteps of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) by upholding the
Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. Judges were no longer to depart above the guideline range maximum
unless a jury hears and admits all the sentencing factors of the case. The only exception to this is when a judge
considers prior felony convictions.
The Impact of Blakely v. Washington
The impact of Blakely cannot be taken for granted. Berman (2005) concluded that “Blakely may be the most
consequential and important criminal justice decision not just in recent terms, not just on the Rehnquist Court, but
perhaps in the history of the Supreme Court” (p. 41). Although the use of aggravated sentencing is not typical, its
immediate effects were widespread. Within weeks, state courts and lower federal courts were already ruling that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional based on the precedent set in Blakely and Apprendi (Berman,
2005).
Bowman (2004) suggested that “[Blakely] really is unprecedented in effect. No Supreme Court opinion in living
memory, perhaps no opinion in American history, has caused near-paralysis of either state or federal criminal justice
systems by placing the outcome of every case in doubt” (p. 252). Some have suggested, therefore, that presumptive
sentencing guidelines should simply be voluntary instead (Frase, 2007). One of the main problems with Blakely is
the directional bias it now imposes on the right to jury trial (Bowman, 2004). Juries are now required to find facts
that increase a sentence above the guideline range maximum, yet the Court in Blakely does no give the jury the right
to determine facts that either set a defendants’ minimum sentence or mitigate a defendants’ presumptive sentence.

CURRENT STUDY
The purpose of the current study is to explore the potential effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v.
Washington on upward departures from the sentencing guidelines. Prior research suggested both legal and extralegal
factors may play a role when a judge decides to depart from the guidelines. One of the purposes of the sentencing
guidelines was to reduce discretion and increase certainty of punishment (Spohn, 2000). Given that judges, prior to

B. Iannacchione & J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2008)

4

The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol#24 (Iss#4), 2008.
SAGE Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.

Blakely, had discretional authority to aggravate sentences above the sentencing guideline range maximum and that
discretion may lead to reliance on extralegal factors, this study examines upward departures both before and after
the Blakely decision to reveal any potential reduction in unwarranted disparity in upward departure decisions in the
state of Washington.5
Hypotheses
Since judicial discretion is further limited given the ruling in Blakely, it is hypothesized that aggravated sentences
are less common after the decision in Blakely compared to before this decision. Another set of hypotheses is related
to prior research that suggested that judges take numerous legal and extralegal variables into account in their
sentencing decisions. The focal concerns theory (see Steffensmeier et al., 1998) suggests that judges view particular
defendants to be more blameworthy and/or more dangerous than other defendants. It is the contention, given the
ruling in Blakely, that judges are more likely to impose an upward departure for minority defendants, for younger
defendants, and for male defendants prior to Blakely but not after Blakely.
METHODOLOGY
The current study examines sentencing data collected from the state of Washington to study whether or not the
decision of Blakely v. Washington (2004) affects the likelihood of upward departures. The sample for this study is
drawn from all sentencing decisions in felony cases resulting in a guilty decision in the state of Washington.6 A pretest/post-test research design is employed, examining cases decided within twenty-seven months7 before Blakely
(pre-Blakely hereafter) and twenty-seven months after Blakely (post-Blakely hereafter). Blakely v. Washington was
decided on June 24, 2004; therefore, this study encompasses cases from March 2002 to May 2004 representing preBlakely and cases from July 2004 until October 2006 representing post-Blakely.
Since the population of cases includes mostly non-aggravated sentences (over 98%), a disproportionate stratified
sample was used. A disproportionate stratified sample takes “a larger than proportionate number of certain groups
to assure the appearance of a sufficient number of cases for comparative purposes of a group that is small in the
population. (Hagan, 2005, p. 136; see also Champion, 2006; Maxfield & Babbie, 2008). “[I]f only a small number
of people in a population exhibit some attribute or characteristic of interest, then a large sample must be drawn to
produce adequate numbers of elements that exhibit the uncommon condition.” (Maxfield & Babbie, 2008, p. 229).
Several studies have utilized this approach comparing degrees earned by inmates while incarcerated (Batiuk, Lahm,
Mckeever, Wilcox, & Wilcox, 2005), attitudes towards juvenile death penalty among different racial/ethnic groups
(Vogel & Vogel, 2003), executed sentences before and after the imposition of the sentencing guidelines in
Minnesota (Miethe, 1987), juvenile referrals among different racial/ethnic categories (Leiber, 1993), and
punishment severity of illegal aliens and non-illegal aliens (McShane, 1987)
The current study uses a disproportionate stratified sampling procedure to produce a higher proportion of cases
resulting in an aggravated sentence compared to their representation in the population of cases. For the overall
sample of cases in the 52-month period surrounding the Blakely decision, the population of cases resulting in an
aggravated sentence (or, upward departure) is included and an equal number of randomly selected cases resulting in
a non-aggravated sentence are included in the analyses.8 The purpose of using this sampling procedure is two-fold.
First, the sampling procedure allows for heterogeneity in the variable of interest. With only 1.9% of the cases
resulting in an aggravated sentence in the overall population, the dependent variable is homogenous and appears to
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Since the current study examines data in the state of Washington, it is possible the findings in the current study
might be applicable only to Washington and not other sentencing guideline states. The explorative nature of this
study should lend support to other relevant examinations in other sentencing guideline states. This limitation is
further addressed in the discussion section.
6
The limited data were provided by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission of Washington.
7
The initial proposal for this project was presented in October 2006 which necessitated a 27 month pre- and postperiod.
8
The results are slightly different comparing the sampling structure used in this study to the overall population of
cases within the given time frame.
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be more like a constant than a variable. Second, using the entire population of cases arguably results in masked
findings. The sheer number of cases resulting in a non-aggravated sentence overwhelms potentially important
influences on upward departures before and after Blakely.
Variables
The dependent variable for this study is whether or not a case received an aggravated sentence – identified as an
“exceptional sentence” in the state of Washington. Upward departures (or aggravated sentences) were coded as one
and all other sentences – within or below the sentence guideline range – were coded as zero.
Several legal and/or extralegal variables are included to examine potential effects on the decision to depart above the
sentencing guideline range maximum. Due to the explorative purpose of this research and the secondary nature of
the data, other relevant factors – such as type of current offense – were not made available. This is a limitation of
this current study, but it is believed that some important first steps can be taken in exploring this field of study. The
legal variables in this study are the severity of the current offense and prior record level. The severity of the current
offense is measured by the offense score (range = 0-15) as determined by the sentencing guidelines in the state of
Washington. A higher offense severity score indicates a more severe current offense. The prior record level is
measured by the prior record score which is a ranked value of the offender’s prior convictions (range = 0-9) rather
than a count of prior convictions. This prior record score is determined by a calculus provided by the Sentencing
Commission in the state of Washington. This calculus9 consists of four general variables: adult history, juvenile
history, other current offenses, and the status of the offender. The number of convictions – usually felony – or
factors at each stage is multiplied (or weighted) by the severity of those convictions (e.g. serious violent, other
violent, non-violent) or factors. The total number for each of these categories is then summed to obtain the prior
record score – called an “offender score.” Calculations can be oriented differently based on the type of current
offense conviction. A higher prior record score indicates a higher prior record level.
The current study also includes several extralegal variables that may affect a judge’s decision to increase the
sentence above the sentencing guideline range maximum. The extralegal variables that are included in this study are
race/ethnicity, age, gender, and mode of conviction. Race/ethnicity is coded as a dummy variable: white, black,
Hispanic, and other. In the multivariate analysis, “white” is the reference category against which the other
categories are compared. Mode of conviction is a dichotomous variable measuring whether the defendant was found
guilty in a bench/jury trial or pled guilty.
Along with basic descriptive analyses, three logistic regression analyses are run: baseline model with a pre-post
variable included, pre-Blakely model, and post-Blakely model. This analysis allows for comparisons of the effects of
the extralegal variables on the decision to impose an upward departure before and after Blakely. Additionally, a
comparison of significant unstandardized coefficients is conducted by running a differences in slopes test for
independent samples (see Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). This analysis allows for a comparison
between the significant findings in the pre-Blakely period and the post-Blakely period to test whether one significant
factor has a stronger effect on the dependent variable for one sample compared to the other sample. This test, if
successful, might indicate that the effect of post-Blakely factors may have a weaker hold on upward departures
compared to the same pre-Blakely factors despite there being significance in both samples
Since the data are limited to what was provided, the strength of the findings is somewhat limited. However, to date,
no empirical analysis has explored the effect of Blakely on sentence guideline departures using a pre-test and posttest design. Therefore, this study will shed some light on an area of study not already explored.

9

Please see the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission website for further details
(http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/Interactive/formlinks.asp#d accessed April 10, 2008).
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FINDINGS
The overall sample from which this study further partitioned consists of 116,274 cases and includes approximately
80% male defendants. The majority of defendants are white (77%), while blacks made up 14% and Hispanics 4% of
the sample. The average age of the individuals in this overall sample is approximately 34 years old. The vast
majority of cases resulted in a guilty plea (96%) and approximately 2% resulted in an aggravated sentence – or,
upward departure.

The partitioned baseline sample is similar to the larger sample in every way except the percentage of aggravated
sentences. More specifically, the baseline sample includes 50% cases resulting in an aggravated sentence and 50%
cases resulting in a non-aggravated sentence. See Table 1 for a summary of the descriptive statistics for the baseline
sample. The vast majority of defendants are male (82.8%) and white (77.3%) with 13.5% black and 4.5% Hispanic.
The average age in the baseline sample is approximately 35 years old and most cases resulted in a guilty plea (95%).
Insert Table 1 here
Due to the pre-test, post-test design of the study, it is important to address important differences in the makeup of
cases adjudicated in Washington before and after the Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington. Table 2
highlights the descriptive statistics of both the pre- and post-Blakely samples. The pre-Blakely sample includes 2,709
cases. Over half of the pre-Blakely sample resulted in an upward departure. Similar to the baseline and overall
sample, 77.3% of the defendants are white, 13.4% are black, and 4.6% are Hispanic. The pre-Blakely sample is
mostly male (83.4%), similar to the percentages found in the baseline and overall samples. The average age of this
sample is approximately 36 years old, and the vast majority of the pre-Blakely sample pled guilty (93.6%).
Insert Table 2 here
In the post-Blakely sample, there is a decrease in the percentage of cases resulting in an upward departure (41.4%).
This decrease might be an effect of the Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington. In the post-Blakely
sample most of the defendants are male (81.9%) and white (77.3%) with black defendants making up 13.6% and
Hispanic defendants making up 4.2% of the sample. The average age is only slightly younger – approximately 34
years old. There are slightly more cases that resulted in a guilty plea (97.5%) compared to the pre-Blakely sample
which may indicate a trend that the prosecutor has a bigger role in plea bargaining cases that would likely garner an
upward departure.
Multivariate Analyses
Logistic regression is used to examine the effects of offender characteristics on upward departures, controlling for
legally relevant factors. Logistic regression is run to account for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable
(Menard, 2002). These analyses are run for the baseline sample as well as for the pre- and post-Blakely samples. The
current study also conducts a differences in slopes test between the pre-Blakely and post-Blakely samples to make an
inferred conclusion of the impact of the Blakely decision on the determinants of upward departure decision-making.
If the differences in slopes test is found to be statistically significant, then it can be suggested that a variable has a
stronger or weaker influence in one sample compared to the other sample. Given that the major difference between
the two samples is whether the sample was taken before or after the Blakely decision, it can be suggested that the
influence is uniquely tied to the Supreme Court ruling in Blakely. However, the power of this conclusion is
somewhat limited due to the limited number of factors taken into consideration.
Baseline Model
The model for the baseline sample indicates that all legal and some of the extralegal factors are found to be
statistically significant (p <. 05). The findings from the baseline regression analyses summarized in Table 3 indicate
that there is a statistically significant (p < .05) decrease in the use of upward departures. In fact, the odds of a case
receiving an upward departure after the Blakely decision is 69% less than the odds of receiving an upward departure
before the Blakely decision. Table 3 shows that offense severity and prior record level have a positively significant
impact on the decision to aggravate the sentence. As expected, when the offense severity and/or prior record level
increase, the likelihood of an upward departure increases. Most of the extralegal variables – gender, age, and mode
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of conviction – are also found to have a positively significant impact on upward departures. For the most part, race
and/or ethnicity were found not to have an effect on the decision to aggravate the sentence (p > .05). The largest
substantive effect of a particular variable on the aggravated sentence decision is gender. Male defendants are almost
twice as likely to receive an upward departure as female defendants.
Insert Table 3 here
Pre-Blakely Model
Similar to the baseline model, the pre-Blakely model only has a 4.7% reduction in error (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.047)
which indicates that important factors are not considered in model construction. This problem, though, is typical of
explorative research and secondary data analysis. The statistically significant factors (p < .05) in this sample are
prior record, age, and gender. Male defendants are over twice as likely to receive an upward departure as female
defendants (odds ratio = 2.038). The substantive effects of prior record and age are minimal. Unlike the baseline
model, though, offense severity and “other race/ethnicity” is not a statistically significant effect (p > .05).
Post-Blakely Model
The findings for the post-Blakely sample are also included in Table 3. The statistically significant predictors (p <
.05) of the upward departure decision after the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington in 2004 are prior
record, age, gender, and whether the defendant’s race/ethnicity was characterized as “other” or not. The most
substantive of these effects is whether the defendant’s race/ethnicity category was “other” or not. Defendants who
are in the “other” racial/ethnic category are approximately two times less likely to receive an upward departure
(odds ratio = 0.517) than white defendants.10 Male defendants are over 1 ½ times more likely to receive an
aggravated sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum than female defendants (odds ratio = 1.774).
Although statistically significant, the prior record level and age of the defendant yields little substantive influence on
predicting whether the particular defendant receives an upward departure or not.
Since a few of the extralegal variables are statistically significant in both the pre-Blakely sample and the postBlakely sample, the differences in slopes test can be used to compare the unstandardized effects of the same variable
between independent samples (see Paternoster et al., 1998). This test can further articulate whether (and which)
significant factors have more influence in one sample compared to another sample. The samples, in this instance, are
cases before Blakely and cases after Blakely. These results are summarized in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
The results of this analysis indicate that the test did not provide a statically significant difference in the influence of
these variables between the pre-Blakely and post-Blakely samples. However, it should be noted that the z score for
prior record is positive and the z scores for each of the included extralegal variables are negative. A positive z score
in this analysis indicates that the variable has stronger influence in the post-Blakely sample than in the pre-Blakely
sample, whereas a negative z score indicates that the variable has a weaker influence in the post-Blakely sample than
in the pre-Blakely sample. Therefore, the legal variable included in this test is “approaching” stronger influence and
the extralegal variables are “approaching” weaker influence after Blakely compared to before Blakely. It should be
cautioned, though, that the z scores were still found not to be statistically significant. Therefore, the formal
conclusion is that there is no difference of influence between the independent samples. From a theoretical
standpoint, though, the direction of the z score is an important one to note.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington limited judicial discretion – even further than the sentencing
guidelines themselves. One of the purposes of sentencing guidelines was to limit discretion and reduce unwarranted
disparity. Given this ruling, it was suggested that the likelihood of upward departure sentencing – an area of judicial
discretion still remaining until Blakely – should result in very little, if any, unwarranted disparate decision-making.
10

The calculated odds ratio can be transformed by dividing the calculated odds ratio into 1 to obtain an inverse ratio
of 1.934. The greater the distance of the value of odds ratio below 1 yields a greater “negative” likelihood.
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The hypotheses of this research, therefore, posited that the extralegal variables – race/ethnicity, gender, and age–
would only have significant effects before Blakely but not after Blakely. If statistically significant relationships still
exist after Blakely, it is suggested that the influence of extralegal factors should be weaker than before Blakely.
Although the majority of cases in this study did not result in an upward departure, it was found that the odds of an
upward departure was greater before Blakely than after Blakely. There was also some indication that extralegal
factors influence the judge’s decision to aggravate the sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum.
Although prior record score was found to be statistically significant in all models (i.e., baseline, pre-Blakely, and
post-Blakely), other factors such as age and gender were also found to be statistically significant. Substantively,
other than the post-Blakely model, gender had the most substantive meaningful effect. In the post-Blakely model,
race/ethnicity (i.e., “other”) had the most substantively meaningful effect.
The hypotheses regarding the influence of extralegal factors on aggravated sentencing were not supported in these
findings. In other words, it was suggested that race/ethnicity, gender, age, and mode of conviction would not have an
effect on the decision to aggravate the sentence above the sentence guideline range maximum after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington. The results indicate that age and gender had an effect on the upward
departure decision before and after the Blakely ruling.
An area of research that does not garner the scholarly attention is in the area of prosecutorial discretion. Given that
the prosecutor holds great discretional authority in the American criminal court system and given that there is
renewed restrictions on judicial discretional authority with the ruling in Blakely, the finding of disparate sentencing
may be a somewhat muted result of disparate discretionary decision-making by the prosecutor. The discretional
authority may have simply been displaced from the judge to the prosecutor. A prosecutor can have significant
influence on sentencing decisions through charging and plea bargaining cases.
Limitations
This study’s findings should be taken as simply explorative. One of the limitations of this study is a product of
using secondary data; that is, there is an absence of relevant variables in the models. A key factor in a judge’s
determination of aggravating a sentence or not is the type and/or strength of evidence brought forward. Since the
ruling in Blakely hinges on the evidence upon which the aggravated sentence is relied, it would be important to
include these factors when constructing the proposed models. The type of crime committed by the offender would
be important to include since racial/ethnic differences are likely contextualized by crime type. Another factor not
considered is whether a weapon was used or not during the commission of the crime. Type of attorney was also not
included. The type of attorney – public or private – has also been found to play a role in sentencing decisions, with
defendants assigned to public defenders more likely to receive more severe sentences than those with private
attorneys (see Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Spohn, 2002). Another key variable missing from this dataset is the
race/ethnicity of the judge. Steffensmeier and Britt (2001) suggested that, while there is considerable overlap in the
sentences imposed by all judges, black judges are more likely to incarcerate defendants and their sentencing
decisions are more punitive in nature.
Another limitation is the lack of qualitative information about why judges aggravated sentences for particular
defendants but not for others. Including this information might give more insight about why judges impose
aggravated sentences – or, upward departures. Starting dialogues with judges from Washington may glean more
information on exactly what is taken into account when they decide to sentence an offender above that suggested by
the sentence guidelines. It would also be important to know why some extralegal variables – gender and age – still
have an effect after Blakely. Due to the time constraints of this project, though, qualitative data were not collected.
A final limitation is that data were only analyzed from one state. While the findings from this study can be
generalized to other states with sentencing guidelines in a general way, the findings from this study cannot be
generalized in a specific way. In other words, although sentencing guidelines are similar, there are enough
differences to analyze data from each state to mete out important differences between states. For example,
Washington’s sentencing guidelines are more narrowly defined than other states’ sentencing guidelines by already
disallowing upward departures based on facts to prove an offense that was not formally charged (Frase, 2007). It is
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possible, therefore, that important potential findings were masked using such a restrictive sentencing guideline state.
It is also difficult to apply this research to non-sentence guideline states due to the differences in sentencing
philosophies between guideline states and non-guideline states.
In conclusion, Berman (2005) found a silver lining in the Blakely decision. Blakely caused major confusion in the
conceptualization of sentencing; however, the problem is that the sentencing reform movement was underdeveloped
in both theory and practice in the first place. The Blakely ruling offers a chance, in Berman’s (2005) opinion, to
reconceptualize the modern sentencing reforms. He suggested that the sentencing revolution rejected rehabilitative
theory and had lax administrative procedures for the application of a new sentencing structure, both of which have
not been addressed by policymakers, courts, or academics (Berman, 2005). Regardless of one’s thoughts on Blakely,
he argued that it should be praised for stimulating a national dialogue on sentencing policy, law procedures, and
practices (Berman, 2005). With the swelling of both state and federal prison populations, new sentencing reforms
are in order, and the dialogue started by Blakely may lead to drastic changes – especially if it is successful in further
limiting judicial discretion and eliminating unwarranted disparity once and for all. Frase (2007) suggested that one
of these drastic changes might be creating voluntary sentencing guideline systems that were once presumptive.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington further restricted judicial discretion by limiting the ability to
depart above the predetermined sentencing guideline range. After this ruling, a judge must garner a factual
determination of the facts upon which s/he can grant an upward departure. This study finds, in a formal way, that
even though judicial discretion is further limited, disparities still exist in judges’ aggravated sentencing decisions.
This study is explorative; more extensive research should continue to analyze the potential effects of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington in sentencing guideline states on upward departures.
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Table 1. Codes and Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables for the Baseline Sample
Variable

Code

Dependent Variable
Upward Departures

N

%

0 = no upward departure
1 = upward departure

2,198
2,198

50.0
50.0

0 = white
1 = black
2 = Hispanic

3,180
554
184

77.3
13.5
4.5

3 = Other

197

4.8

0 = female
1 = male

715
3,449

17.2
82.8

Mean

Independent Variables
Extralegal Variables
Race/ethnicity

Gender

Age
Mode of Conviction

4,350
0 = plea
1 = trial

Legal Variables
Offense Seriousness Score
Prior Record Score

4,180
216

35.1
95.1
4.9

4,396

2.79

4,396

2.62

Note: Numbers reflect missing cases and may not equal original sample size (n = 4,396).
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Table 2. Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables for Pre- and Post-Blakely Samples
N

Pre-Blakely
%
Mean

N

Post-Blakely
%
Mean

Dependent Variable
Upward Departures
No

1,210

44.7

988

58.6

Yes

1,499

55.3

699

41.4

White

1,961

77.3

1,219

77.3

Black

340

13.4

214

13.6

Hispanic

117

4.6

67

4.2

Other

120

4.7

77

4.9

Female

425

16.6

290

18.1

Male

2,136

83.4

1313

81.9

Independent Variables
Extralegal Variables
Race/ethnicity

Gender

Age

35.8

33.9

Mode of Conviction
Plea

2,536

93.6

1,644

97.5

Trial

173

6.4

43

2.5

Legal Variables
Offense Severity Score

2.84

2.71

Prior Record Score

2.60

2.65

Note: Numbers reflect missing cases and may not equal original sample size.

B. Iannacchione & J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2008)

13

The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol#24 (Iss#4), 2008.
SAGE Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.

Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for Baseline, Pre-Blakely, and Post-Blakely Samples
Baseline

Pre-Blakely

b

Odds Ratio

b

Blakely Timeline

-0.525*

0.591

--

(“Post-Blakely” = 1)

(0.066)

Offense Severity Score

0.029*

1.030

0.026

Prior Record Score

(0.016)

*

*

0.042

1.043

Age

0.329

1.390

(0.183)
*

1.018

(0.004)

*

*

-0.142

1.936

0.058

0.867

(0.156)
Other

-0.397

Constant
Nagelkerke R
N

2

1.036

-0.165
0.255

1.300

-0.255

1.039

0.056*

1.058

0.606

1.834

(0.343)
1.020

0.013*

1.013

(0.005)
2.038

0.573*

1.774

(0.142)
0.848

-0.098

0.907

(0.153)
1.290

(0.201)
0.672

0.038

(0.018)

(0.121)
1.059

*

0.712

Odds Ratio

(0.021)

(0.110)

(0.095)
Hispanic

0.020

(0.003)
(0.087)
Black

0.263

*

0.661

1.026

(0.015)

(0.161)
0.017

Gender

*

0.035

b
--

(0.013)
(0.012)
Mode of Conviction

Odds Ratio

Post-Blakely

-0.298

0.743

(0.265)
0.775

-0.660*

(0.154)

(0.193)

(0.266)

-1.099

-1.205

-1.446

0.068

0.047

0.046

4,396

2,709

1,687

0.517

Standard errors in parentheses
*p < .05
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Table 4. Differences in Slopes Test for Independent Samples
Pre-Blakely Sample

Post-Blakely Sample

b

SE

b

SE

Z score

Prior Record Score

0.035

0.015

0.056

0.018

0.896

Age

0.020

0.004

0.013

0.005

-1.093

Gender

0.712

0.110

0.573

0.142

-0.774

Other Race

-0.225

0.193

-0.660

0.266

-1.324

*p < .05 (two tailed)
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